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ABSTRACT. According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, 
where this means that the agent’s cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One 
type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the 
contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial 
knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. 
We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically depend on third-party 
members of their epistemic community as many social epistemologists contend, then there 
will be cases where two agents differ epistemically despite being virtue-theoretic duplicates. 
This means that robust virtue epistemology, at least insofar as it is understood along standard 
lines such that it endorses epistemic individualism, is also in tension with a central 
commitment of contemporary social epistemology.          
 
 
 
1.VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE GETTIER PROBLEM 
 
Gettier-style cases have a good-luck-bad-luck structure. An agent forms the belief that p on a basis 
that ensures that the belief is justified. By dint of bad epistemic luck, however, the way the belief 
was formed would normally prevent it from being true. But by dint of good epistemic luck which 
cancels out the bad, the belief is true nonetheless. The result is that the agent ends up with a 
justified true belief which, in virtue of the epistemic luck in play, does not count as knowledge.1  
For instance, consider the famous ‘fake-sheep’ Gettier-style case.2 In this example, the 
subject forms the justified belief that there’s a sheep in the field on the basis of a visual perception 
as of a sheep. By dint of bad luck, the animal the agent is looking at in the field is in fact a cleverly 
disguised dog, and hence one would normally expect the belief so formed to be false, even though 
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justified. But by dint of good luck which cancels out the bad, it just so happens that behind the 
dog is a hidden sheep. So the agent ends up with a justified true belief, and yet given the epistemic 
luck in play in this case, the agent’s belief does not amount to knowledge. 
 On the face of it, virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge—i.e., those accounts of 
knowledge in which the cognitive abilities (/epistemic virtues) of the agent play a central role—
should have a tricky time dealing with Gettier-style case.3 For are not the true beliefs formed in 
such cases the product of cognitive ability? For instance, wouldn’t we want to say that the agent in 
the fake sheep case used his cognitive ability in forming his true belief in the target proposition? 
Indeed, isn’t the fact that he has appropriately employed his cognitive ability the reason why we 
are inclined to treat the belief in question as justified? With this point in mind, insofar as one 
conceives of one’s virtue epistemology as being in the business of offering a theory of knowledge, 
then one will be inclined towards a view on which epistemic virtue is merely a necessary part of 
the picture.4   
For example, one might hold that knowledge is to be understood as true belief which is 
virtuously formed and which, in addition, meets some sort of anti-luck condition, such as—most 
promisingly—the safety condition (i.e., that one’s cognitive success could not have very easily been 
cognitive failure).5 In this way, the task of offering a theory of knowledge would not rest on the 
virtue-theoretic aspect of the account alone. In particular, one can call on further epistemic 
conditions—in this case the safety condition—to eliminate the knowledge-undermining epistemic 
luck in play in the Gettier-style cases. Call this type of virtue epistemology—i.e., one which offers 
an account of knowledge which includes other epistemic conditions over and above virtue-
theoretic epistemic conditions—modest virtue epistemology.6 
 But there is a bolder version of virtue epistemology in play in the contemporary 
epistemological literature. According to this proposal, the way to deal with Gettier-style case is to 
say that while a subject forms her belief as a result of exercising her perceptual abilities, that belief 
is not true because of the exercise of her perceptual abilities because this belief instead owes its truth 
to environmental happenstance. Consider the fake sheep case again. Sure, we have epistemic virtue 
and we have cognitive success (i.e., true belief). But is the agent’s cognitive success because of the 
exercise of his cognitive ability? Intuitively, it is not.7 
More generally, according to this proposal an agent has knowledge when her cognitive 
success (i.e., her true belief) is because of her cognitive ability. Call this type of virtue 
epistemology—i.e., one which offers an account of knowledge in terms of only virtue-theoretic 
epistemic conditions—robust virtue epistemology.8 This proposal has a number of high-profile 
supporters, including Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco.9 
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 Consider, for the purposes of illustration, Sosa’s presentation of robust virtue 
epistemology (which is arguably the most influential). Sosa argues that performances in general 
have a triple-A structure: they are apt when accurate because adroit. Take archery. Unskilled archers 
occasionally hit the target. They are lucky. But even the success of master archers can be down to 
luck: a sudden gust diverts the arrow upon being skilfully dispatched but then a compensating gust 
brings the arrow back on course again. The conjunction of accuracy and adroitness falls short of 
aptness. Despatching the arrow is an apt performance just in case the arrow hits the target because 
of the adroitness of archer’s archery.  
What applies to performances in general also applies, argues Sosa, to the specific cognitive 
performance involved in the acquisition of knowledge. That is, apt belief (i.e., knowledge) is 
accurate belief (i.e., true belief) where the accuracy is because of the agent’s cognitive adroitness 
(i.e., the agent’s epistemic virtue). In the fake-sheep case, for example, the subject’s belief is both 
accurate and adroit, but it is not apt, and hence it does not amount to knowledge. For just as the 
archer’s lucky hitting of the target does not amount to an apt performance because of the luck 
involved, so the agent’s cognitive success in the fake sheep case does not amount to apt belief 
either. In both cases the luck involved means that the agent’s success is not accurate because 
adroit.10 
  
 
2. TESTIMONY AND RELIABLE RECEPTION 
 
Let strong epistemic individualism be the view that what converts a true belief into knowledge 
supervenes on internal features of the agent. If undefeated doxastic justification is that which is 
responsible for the conversion, then strong epistemic individualism is the view that undefeated 
doxastic justification supervenes on internal agential features. In contrast, some epistemologists 
hold that although doxastic justification supervenes on such features, what might defeat such 
justification does not. Let therefore weak epistemic individualism be the view that defeasible doxastic 
justification supervenes on internal features of the agent. 
 For a clear example of weak epistemic individualism, consider the process reliabilist view 
defended by Alvin Goldman. According to this view, a belief is justified just in case the (type of) 
cognitive process through which it was formed and sustained is reliable. Importantly, Goldman is 
explicit that the implicated processes are purely internal—they are operations of the cognitive 
faculties residing inside the agent’s skin and skull.11 In contrast, Goldman’s conception of 
epistemic defeat is non-individualistic.12 For instance, the epistemic status of the agent’s belief is 
undermined if she has misleading evidence that the belief-producing process is unreliable, but the 
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possession of such evidence need not supervene on her internal features.  
 We shall henceforth set epistemic defeat aside and talk about epistemic individualism 
simpliciter. Goldman’s process reliabilism illustrates that some epistemic externalists are epistemic 
individualists, but note also that epistemic anti-individualism is compatible with epistemic 
internalism. Imagine a mentalist who holds that the epistemic standing of an agent’s beliefs 
supervenes on the mental states of the agent, but who further endorses the extended mind 
hypothesis with respect to justification-conferring mental states such that those states extend 
beyond the boundaries of the agent’s skin and skull.13 
 Reflect also that epistemic individualism is best defined in terms of weak supervenience rather 
than strong supervenience.14 The true belief held by an internal duplicate of a knowing agent counts as 
knowledge only if that duplicate occupies the same possible world as the knowing agent. Shift the 
duplicate to a different possible world and her true belief need not count as knowledge. That is to 
say, epistemic individualists maintain that doxastic justification is intra-world narrow rather than 
inter-world narrow, to use the terminology employed by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit.15 There is 
thus a specific sense in which even epistemic individualists can allow that justification depends on 
features of the external world.  
 Robust virtue epistemology is normally characterised in such a way that it is clearly 
committed to epistemic individualism. On this view, when an agent knows she gets things right 
through her own cognitive abilities, where these abilities are thought of along individualistic lines 
as being located where she is and as having a physical basis resident in her. Sosa, for example, 
understands cognitive abilities in terms of what he calls ‘competences’, which he characterises as 
follows: 
 
“[A] competence is a disposition, one with its basis resident in the competent agent, one 
that would in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of 
any relevant performance issued by it.”16 
 
Indeed, robust virtue epistemology is often expressed in terms of how when an agent knows her 
cognitive success is primarily creditable to her cognitive ability (i.e., such that the most salient 
factor in her cognitive success is her cognitive ability).17 That’s just what is held to be missing in 
Gettier-style cases, since these are such that the agent gets things right in virtue of incidental 
features of her environment (e.g., the sheep hidden from view behind the sheep-shaped object) 
rather than because of her own cognitive ability. Accordingly, while the Gettierised agent’s 
cognitive success might well be to some degree creditable to her cognitive ability, it is not primarily 
creditable to her cognitive ability but rather primarily due to these incidental features of the 
environment.  
 Conversely, when an agent has bona fide knowledge her cognitive success, while primarily 
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creditable to the agent’s cognitive ability, will also be typically creditable to some small yet non-
negligible degree to nomological facts and environmental features. As a comparison, consider 
solubility. The internal physical structure of a solute is primarily responsible for its dissolution 
when immersed in a solvent, but physical properties of the solvent as well as prevalent laws of 
natures also play an indispensable albeit minor role. For instance, the same substance might not 
form a solution if immersed in the same liquid in a possible world with deviant laws of nature. Or 
take the analogy with archery which many robust virtue epistemologists are fond of. When an 
expert archer propels the arrow through the innermost ring as a result of exercising her skill of 
archery, the success is primarily creditable to the archer. Still, nomological regularities and 
environmental features also play a minor role in accounting for her hitting the target. For instance, 
if an entirely unpredictable change in the prevalent wind direction had suddenly occurred, even an 
expert archer would have missed the target. But that is perfectly compatible with the weakly 
supervening of that archery ability on the internal physical make-up of the archer. In short, 
dispositional properties—be they cognitive or physical—weakly supervene on their physical base 
properties. This means that while robust virtue epistemology exemplifies epistemic individualism, 
this view need not deny that getting things right through exercising the pertinent cognitive abilities 
is independent of anything external to the agent.18 
 Even so, it is precisely this commitment to epistemic individualism which creates problems 
for robust virtue epistemology when it comes to certain kinds of testimonial knowledge. The 
reason for this is that on standard views of testimonial knowledge it is possible to acquire such 
knowledge in suitable circumstances by, to a large extent, trusting the word of another. But 
because of the trust involved in these cases, however, it does not seem right to say that the agent 
who gains testimonial knowledge in this way is primarily creditable for the relevant cognitive 
success (indeed, if any one person is primarily creditable for this cognitive success it is surely the 
informant).  
 Jennifer Lackey offers the following testimonial case to illustrate this problem:  
  
“Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions to the Sears 
Tower. He looks around, randomly approaches the first passerby that he sees, and asks how to get to 
his desired destination. The passerby, who happens to be a Chicago resident who knows the city 
extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears Tower.”19  
  
Lackey then writes: 
  
“What explains why Morris got things right has nearly nothing of epistemic interest to do with him 
and nearly everything of epistemic interest to do with the passerby. In particular, it is the passerby’s 
experience with and knowledge of the city of Chicago that explains why Morris ended up with a true 
belief rather than a false belief […]. Thus, though it is plausible to say that Morris acquired 
knowledge from the passerby, there seems to be no substantive sense in which Morris deserves 
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credit for holding the true belief that he does.”20 
 
Lackey’s aim with this example is to offer an argument for a very strong claim indeed—viz., that 
Morris is to no significant degree creditable for his cognitive success, and thus that an agent can 
gain knowledge even while such knowledge is in no significant way creditable to his cognitive 
ability. We think that the example does not show this much, but that it is important for assessing 
the merits of robust virtue epistemology nonetheless.  
We hold that two further features of the Morris case need to be added if it is to be a clear 
case of testimonial knowledge. The first is that we need to stipulate that Morris is in fact in an 
epistemically favourable environment, one in which testifiers tend to be honest and reliable about 
the subject matter in question. While trusting the word of another may be a good route to 
knowledge in such epistemically favourable environments, it is not generally a good route to 
testimonial knowledge, and hence we need to make this feature of the case explicit if we are to 
retain the clear intuition that Morris gains testimonial knowledge in this case.   
The second feature we need to add to this case if it is to be a clear case of testimonial 
knowledge is that Morris had better not be merely trusting the word of another. That is, we need to 
be reading the case such that Morris is displaying a reasonable degree of relevant cognitive skill. 
For example, if Morris had been willing to ask just anyone (or anything) in order to get the 
information he seeks, including potential informants who clearly would not be good sources of 
information (e.g., a small child), then we don’t think it would be intuitive to suppose that he gains 
testimonial knowledge in this case (even though he happens to ask a reliable informant). 
Moreover, if Morris would have been willing to believe just about anything his informant told him, 
no matter how bizarre this might be, then this too would also (we claim) be a barrier to the 
intuition that he gains testimonial knowledge in this case (even though the informant he chanced 
upon in fact gives him reliable information).  
With these two features added to the example, consider now our refined Morris case, which 
we will call the Morris* case. Given what we have just said about how Morris*’s cognitive ability 
must be playing some significant role in his acquisition of testimonial knowledge, it follows that 
his cognitive success is to some significant degree creditable to his cognitive ability. Unlike Lackey, 
then, we are not claiming that an agent can gain knowledge where the cognitive success in 
question is to no significant degree creditable to the agent’s cognitive ability. The point remains, 
however, that given that Morris*’s trust in his informant’s word is playing such a central role in his 
acquisition of knowledge his cognitive success is still not primarily creditable to his cognitive 
ability. The Morris* example is thus in direct conflict with robust virtue epistemology, since on 
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this view an agent’s cognitive success must be primarily creditable to her ability if she is to have 
knowledge, and not merely partly creditable.  
Moreover, we take it that how we are now describing the case—such that the claim is merely 
that an agent can, in epistemically favourable circumstances, gain testimonial knowledge by to a 
large extent (though not completely) trusting the word of another—accords with standard thinking 
amongst epistemologists of testimony. Robust virtue epistemology is thus, it seems, in conflict 
with mainstream views with regard to the epistemology of testimony.21 
One response to this problem, of course, is just to pitch one’s endorsement of robust virtue 
epistemology against mainstream epistemology of testimony. That is, one might bite the bullet and 
argue that Morris* doesn’t have knowledge in this case precisely because of the degree of trust in 
play. While this line of response will obviously be controversial, it is not entirely without merit. 
There are, after all, accounts of the epistemology of testimony in the literature which would be 
inclined towards such an austere line.22 Interestingly, though, no robust virtue epistemologist so far 
as we know has indicated a willingness to take this line of response to this problem. 
Note also that merely retreating to a view on which the agent’s cognitive success need be 
only partially creditable to her cognitive ability will, on the face of it anyway, not help the robust 
virtue epistemologist on this score. Of course, it would resolve the Morris* case, since it would 
now follow that Morris* has knowledge after all, as intuition indicates. But this resolution of the 
Morris* case comes at the expense of preventing robust virtue epistemology from offering their 
distinctive response to the Gettier problem. Consider the fake sheep case again. Wouldn’t we say 
that the agent’s cognitive success in this case is at least as creditable to his cognitive agency as 
Morris*’s cognitive success in the testimonial case? But if so, then insofar as Morris has knowledge 
then so do agents in Gettier-style cases, and this is clearly not the result the robust virtue 
epistemologist is after. 
Robust virtue epistemologists thus seem to be in the grip of a dilemma. Either they stick to 
their guns and argue that Morris* lacks knowledge, in which case they are in conflict with 
mainstream epistemology of testimony, or else they concede that Morris, even though not 
primarily creditable for his cognitive success, has knowledge and thereby lose their distinctive 
response to the Gettier problem. In response to this dilemma, Greco has tried to offer a midway 
course through the alternatives on offer.23  
His basic idea is that robust virtue epistemologists should focus on whether the hearer in 
this case is a reliable receiver or assessor of testimony rather than whether the speaker is a reliable 
testifier or whether the hearer knows that the speaker is a reliable testifier. If that’s the right 
account of testimony, then, as Greco writes: 
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“[…] we have to divide Lackey’s example into two cases: one where Morris is a reliable receiver of 
testimony and one where he is not. From the perspective of a virtue theory, it is only in the first sort 
of case that Morris knows the location of his destination. But in that sort of case, it is also to 
Morris’s credit that he forms a true belief to that effect. That is, his success is grounded in his ability 
to discriminate good from bad testimony and is therefore attributable to him.”24 
 
Greco’s idea is thus to claim that once we focus on the cognitive abilities which Morris employs in 
detecting reliable testimony, then we can reasonably claim that insofar as Morris genuinely does 
have testimonial knowledge in this case then his cognitive success is primarily creditable to his 
cognitive ability after all, and not primarily creditable to his informant. 
 As a response to Lackey’s original Morris case this proposal has some merit. As we noted 
above, it is not all that plausible to suppose both that Morris’s cognitive success is to no significant 
degree creditable to his cognitive ability and that he gains testimonial knowledge in this case. It is 
thus important that Morris should, as Greco puts it, exhibit some relevant cognitive ability to 
‘discriminate good from bad testimony’.  
 But adding this detail to the example does not get Greco off the hook at all, since all it 
does is replace the Morris case with the Morris* case. And yet we have already seen that the 
problem posed for robust virtue epistemology by the Morris* case is just as pressing (if not more 
so, in virtue of trading on more plausible claims). The problem is that while Morris* undoubtedly 
does exhibit some relevant ability to discriminate good testimony from bad, it is not Morris*’s 
cognitive ability which is the most salient part of the story of why he has testimonial knowledge, 
but rather his informant’s cognitive ability. So the problem still stands, even if we grant, with 
Greco, that Morris* is displaying the relevant cognitive ability.  
 In support of his response to Morris-style testimonial cases, Greco suggests an analogy 
with soccer:  
 
“Ted receives a brilliant, almost impossible pass, and then scores an easy goal as a result. In the 
case we are imagining, it is the athletic abilities of the passer that stand out. The pass was brilliant, 
its reception easy […] Nevertheless, Ted deserves credit for the goal. Whatever help Ted got, he is 
the one who put the ball in the net.”25 
 
Greco’s thought is that just as Ted deserves (footballing) credit for the goal, even despite the 
assistance of a much more skilful fellow player, so Morris (/Morris*) deserves (epistemic) credit 
for his cognitive success, and hence can properly count as having knowledge. 
 On closer inspection, however, this example fails to convince. For the issue that concerns 
us is not whether Morris*’s cognitive success is to some degree creditable to his cognitive ability but 
whether it is primarily creditable. As we pointed out, the stronger reading is required in order for 
robust virtue epistemology to deal with the Gettier-style cases. Moreover, it is not in dispute that 
Morris*’s cognitive success is to some degree creditable to his cognitive ability, as we also noted 
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above. So when Greco talks of whether Ted ‘deserves credit’ for the goal, what we really need to 
ask is whether Ted’s goal is primarily creditable to his ability (i.e., and not just whether it is to some 
degree creditable to his ability, which is not in question). But given how the case is set-up it 
doesn’t seem at all right to say that Ted’s goal is primarily creditable to him at all, since it is ex 
hypothesi to a large extent down to the amazing pass he received. We can thus grant that the degree 
to which Morris*’s cognitive success is creditable to his cognitive ability is roughly equivalent to 
the degree to which Ted’s goal-scoring success is creditable to his footballing ability without 
thereby undermining the problem that is posed for robust virtue epistemology by Morris*-style 
testimonial cases.26  
A more radical response to the problem posed by Morris-style cases is offered by Sosa. He 
argues that in such cases the agent’s cognitive success is “attributable to a complex social 
competence only partially seated in the individual believer.”27 It is unclear how to understand this 
suggestion, and Sosa doesn’t offer much by way of explanation. But we take it that his idea is that 
while these Morris-style testimonial cases have in common with Gettier-style cases that the agent’s 
cognitive success is only partially creditable to her cognitive ability, the important difference 
between the two kinds of cases is that it is only in the testimonial case that the agent’s cognitive 
success is primarily creditable to a ‘social competence’ which is displayed by the cognitive whole of 
a ‘testifier-and-testifiee’. In the fake sheep case, after all, the agent concerned is not part of a wider 
cognitive whole to which the cognitive success could be primarily creditable. 
The problem with this proposal is that it is entirely antithetical to the spirit of robust virtue 
epistemology. This, after all, is the view that an agent has knowledge when her cognitive success is 
because of her cognitive ability (only then is her belief apt, as Sosa himself puts it). So construed, 
robust virtue epistemology is explicitly a form of epistemic individualism, as we noted above. But 
what Sosa is now claiming is directly in tension with this claim, since he seems to be conceding 
that at least in some cases an agent can gain knowledge not in virtue of the exercise of their own 
cognitive ability but instead as a result of the part they play in some wider social epistemic 
competence.  
This is not a minor ‘tweak’ to the robust virtue epistemic proposal, but rather a radical 
departure, one that requires explanation and motivation. In particular, we need to be told how this 
claim squares with the more general claims that robust virtue epistemologists make—including 
Sosa—which seem to commit them to epistemic individualism. Unfortunately, Sosa doesn’t 
explore this departure from this view, and instead swiftly returns to advancing a standard form of 
robust virtue epistemology. We are thus left with the choice between a standard construal of 
robust virtue epistemology, one which is wedded to epistemic individualism but which is 
confronted by certain problems with regard to the epistemology of testimony; and a radically new 
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construal of robust virtue epistemology (indeed, a view which may not properly be a form of 
robust virtue epistemology at all), one which holds out the hope of evading these social epistemic 
problems but which we have yet to see the details of.28 
In what follows we will be putting robust virtue epistemology under more pressure on this 
score by showing that its commitment to epistemic individualism ensures that it is not just in 
tension with mainstream views with regard to the epistemology of testimony, but is also in conflict 
with a key commitment of contemporary social epistemology more generally. In particular, we will 
be offering an argument to the effect that the very combination of robust virtue epistemology and 
epistemic individualism is untenable. Moreover, we will be working through that argument with 
Sosa’s own version of robust virtue epistemology in mind, in order to demonstrate that this 
tension exists within his own position, even despite his anti-individualistic response to Morris-style 
cases. 
 
 
3. AN ANTI-INDIVIDUALISTIC THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
 
We have seen that Greco’s response to the problem posed by Morris-style testimonial knowledge 
is to appeal to the agent’s cognitive ability to detect reliable informants. While this response is in 
keeping with the epistemic individualism that robust virtue epistemology is standardly wedded to, 
we noted that it faces some problems. In what follows, we will be presenting an argument to the 
effect that, contra robust virtue epistemology, an agent’s cognitive ability to discriminate good from 
bad testimony cannot possibly ground testimonial knowledge. If that’s right, then the upshot of 
this argument will be that robust virtue epistemology is compelled to jettison its attachment to 
epistemic individualism. The challenge would then be to account for whether the view that 
remains really is a bona fide form of robust virtue epistemology at all.   
Consider Sanford Goldberg’s distinction between direct and diffuse epistemic dependence:  
 
(DIR) A subject S1 directly (epistemically) depends on another subject S2 with respect to S1’s 
doxastic attitude D when the following condition holds: there are variations in S2’s 
epistemic perspective that would make for variations in the epistemic properties of D. 
 
(DIF)  A subject S1 diffusely (epistemically) depends on her community C with respect to her 
doxastic attitude D when the following condition holds: there are variations in the 
practices of the members of C, and variations in the states and dispositions of those 
members, that would make for variations in the epistemic properties of D; and this effect 
remains even after we subtract the effects of any direct epistemic dependence S1 exhibits 
with respect to D.29 
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Knowledge by testimony exemplifies (DIR): when a speaker acquires knowledge by accepting 
reliable testimony she directly epistemically depends on the speaker. But testimonial knowledge 
more broadly understood also exemplifies (DIF) in that testimonial exchanges often give rise to 
knowledge only when communal parties other than the speaker and the hearer are involved in 
remotely monitoring and policing the testimonial exchange in question. In these cases, the epistemic 
dependence is diffuse because the third party is not directly party to the testimonial exchange 
between speaker and hearer. That is to say, the hearer epistemically depends on community-wide 
epistemic monitoring and policing of speakers, thus normally securing a testimonial-friendly 
environment by rooting out the unreliable ones.  
 Let H be an ordinary, competent epistemic agent embedded in an epistemic community 
GOOD in which most other speakers are reliable testifiers. In particular, not only does H possess 
an ability to discriminate between reliable and unreliable informants, she also regularly exercises 
that discriminatory ability in the process of acquiring testimonial knowledge. Moreover, in GOOD 
the testimonial exchanges between H and various speakers are monitored and policed in a 
properly and timely fashion. Assume that H acquires knowledge upon accepting reliable speaker 
S’s testimony. The content of S’s knowledge pertains to an ordinary proposition which pretty 
much any reliable speaker will know. The robust virtue epistemologist’s diagnosis is that H 
acquires knowledge through her discriminatory ability.  
 Now imagine that H is unwittingly transported to epistemic community BAD which also 
mostly contains reliable testifiers. The difference is that while the testimonial processes in GOOD 
are monitored and policed in a knowledge-enabling manner, the corresponding processes in BAD are 
monitored and policed in a knowledge-precluding manner vis-à-vis H. That is to say, third party 
epistemic agents reliably ensure that H is mostly exposed to unreliable speakers. H has no inkling 
of the systematic way in which reliable informants are being screened-off from the testimonial 
processes. Most of the competent-looking speakers with which H comes into contact are in actual 
fact not trustworthy. Now assume that H forms a true belief on the basis of hearing reliable 
speaker S’s testimony. The proposition in question is again an ordinary one which nearly every 
reliable speaker will know. 
 The question is: does H acquire testimonial knowledge in BAD? Here’s an important 
reason to think that she does not. Gettier-style cases demonstrate that knowledge is incompatible 
with luck in the sense that knowledge requires true belief not just in the actual world but also in a 
range of nearby possible worlds. As noted above, one way of expressing this point is by saying that 
knowledge demands safety⎯i.e., that the knowing agent’s true belief could not have easily been 
false. More precisely, knowledge requires a safe basis: if a subject believes truly on a certain basis, then 
not easily would that subject have formed a false belief on that same basis. Thus understood, H’s 
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belief in GOOD is safe because not easily would H have acquired a false belief through testimony. 
Had H approached another informant, she would have still ended up with a true belief because 
nearly all the untrustworthy ones have been weeded out by the third party members of GOOD. 
But H’s belief in BAD is unsafe thus understood. Very easily would H have formed a false belief 
on the same basis. H was fortunate that she ended up forming a true belief on the basis of 
testimony due to the third party members of BAD inadvertently letting a reliable informant slip 
through their net.30 Because most speakers with which H conversationally interact are unreliable, 
had H formed the same belief on the basis of approaching a different informant, that belief would 
have been false. Given that knowledge requires safety, it follows that H lacks knowledge in BAD.31  
 If the foregoing is right, then H has knowledge in GOOD that she lacks in BAD. The 
pressing problem is whether that epistemic difference is down to a virtue-theoretic difference. 
Consider again the ‘triple-A’ structure of knowledge offered by Sosa, such that knowledge is apt 
belief, where apt belief is belief which is accurate because adroit. If we consider each of the As in 
turn it looks as if H in GOOD and H in BAD are virtue-theoretic duplicates.  
Obviously there is no denial of accuracy, because the truth of H’s belief in both GOOD 
and BAD is simply built into the example. Nor does it look as if H in BAD lacks any pertinent 
cognitive ability. It is common ground that H possesses the ability to discriminate between reliable 
and unreliable informants in GOOD. As mentioned in §2, Sosa takes it that abilities, cognitive 
abilities included, have physical bases resident in the agent who possesses those abilities. Given that 
H undergoes no physical change when being shifted from GOOD to BAD, whatever abilities she 
possesses in GOOD are ones she also possesses in BAD.32 Sosa assimilates abilities to dispositions 
in that both are grounded by such a physical basis. Notably, dispositional properties are arguably 
physically necessitated by their intrinsic physical base properties. If the analogy holds, then the fact 
that H in BAD is physically identical to H in GOOD is sufficient for H to possess in BAD 
whatever abilities she possesses in GOOD. The fact that H in BAD is surrounded—physically and 
modally—by unreliable informants is neither here nor there. A sugar cube does not lose its water-
solubility merely by being moved into an environment in which it would not dissolve if immersed 
in a water-like substance. This means that H’s belief is adroit in both GOOD and BAD in that she 
has an ability to discriminate reliable from unreliable informants in the two cases.  
    Finally, H’s belief in GOOD also seems to be apt. H possesses the pertinent ability and 
the conditions for its successful exercise are optimal. So, in GOOD H believing truly manifests 
her ability. But it is equally difficult to see why H in BAD should neither manifest the ability she 
possesses, nor believe truly through that ability. On the model with dispositions, manifestation of 
abilities is a local matter. If you immerse a sugar cube in water it manifests its ability to dissolve 
even if it is surrounded by water-like substances which are such that it might easily have been 
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immersed in one of those and had that been the case it would not have dissolved. Disposition-
manifestation does not require safety. Likewise in the case of H in BAD. All the local physical 
facts pertaining to the testimonial exchange between H and S in BAD are identical to the local 
physical facts as they obtain in GOOD. So, if H manifests her ability to discriminate between 
reliable and unreliable informants in GOOD, then so does H in BAD. In conclusion, if knowledge 
is apt belief as the robust virtue epistemologist contends, then there is no virtue-theoretic 
difference between H in GOOD and H in BAD. But since there clearly is an epistemic difference, 
this view cannot in general be correct. 
 While it is instructive to focus on Sosa’s particular formulation of robust virtue 
epistemology in order to make this point, note that this argument has a general application against 
any form of robust virtue epistemology which is allied to epistemic individualism. For insofar as 
such a view treats knowledge as being cognitive success that is because of the knowing agent’s 
cognitive ability, then it will be subject to this objection. That Sosa, who as we noted above 
elsewhere appears to opt-out of epistemic individualism, is also subject to this complaint reveals 
just how deeply entrenched epistemic individualism is within the robust virtue epistemic account 
of knowledge.  
 
 
4. RESPONSES 
 
One response to this argument would of course be to contend that robust virtue epistemologists 
should reject epistemic individualism. Given how Sosa responds to the Morris-style cases, this 
might make a lot of sense. Note, however, that the challenge is then to spell-out just how the view 
should be understood if it is cast in this way. Sosa’s view is a good example of the problems in 
store here. For as we saw in the last section, the very way that Sosa understands cognitive abilities 
seems to commit him to epistemic individualism. In general, epistemic virtues are most naturally 
characterised as cognitive abilities that supervene on internal, physical features of the agents whose 
abilities they are. But if that’s right, then epistemic individualism is not a thesis that the robust 
virtue epistemologist can give up on very easily.  
 A second response might be to reject the very idea of diffuse epistemic dependency. But 
this is a key commitment of contemporary social epistemology, and hence to take this route would 
put robust virtue epistemology into conflict with contemporary social epistemology. Clearly, then, 
this is not a dialectical option that can be taken lightly either.  
Is there a way that the robust virtue epistemologist might respond to our argument while 
preserving their commitment to epistemic individualism (and without denying any central tenets of 
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contemporary social epistemology)? One possibility in this regard is to modify the robust virtue 
epistemic proposal. For example, John Turri argues that we should add to Sosa’s account of 
knowledge as apt belief. In particular, he argues that knowledge does not just require apt belief but 
also ample belief.33 Ample belief, according to Turri, is when the safety (i.e., and not just the truth) 
of the belief is because of the agent’s cognitive ability. 
By way of illustration, consider Sosa’s twist on the archery example.34 A master archer 
dispatches an arrow, which propels through the bull’s-eye. Unbeknownst to her, a protecting angel 
with a wind machine ensures that the shot would still hit the target had a natural gust suddenly 
diverted the arrow, which it might easily have. While the archer’s success is because of her ability 
(in that the angel did not in fact intervene), the safety of her success (i.e., the fact that her success 
could not have easily been failure) is not because of ability but is rather due to the willingness of 
the angel to intervene. Using Turri’s terminology, this means that the archer’s success, while apt, 
was not ample. Can this distinction between apt and ample success be applied to the epistemic 
case to offer the robust virtue epistemologist a way of responding to our argument?   
Given that the belief that H forms in BAD is unsafe, it follows trivially that her belief in 
BAD is not ample. So, it looks as if the virtue-theorist is home free if only she identifies 
knowledge with ample belief. Indeed, there is independent support for such identification. For 
while H’s true belief in BAD is due to the manifestation of her discriminatory ability, her exercising 
that ability in BAD is unreliable. A cognitive ability is reliable only if it produces mostly true beliefs in 
the actual world and in a range of nearby possible worlds. The fact that exercising H’s 
discriminatory ability in BAD is unreliable therefore implies that the beliefs H forms on the basis 
of its deliverances are unsafe.  
The problem, however, is that it is unclear whether robust virtue epistemology, so 
construed, really is still a robust version of virtue epistemology. As we noted in §1, what is 
distinctive about robust virtue epistemology is that, unlike modest virtue epistemology, it offers a 
purely virtue-theoretic account of knowledge. In particular, what sets it apart from modest virtue 
epistemology is that it does not need to adduce a separate anti-luck condition like safety in order 
to deal with the kind of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck in play in, for example, Gettier-
style cases. But what is it about the view that knowledge is ample belief that makes it any different 
from a modest virtue epistemology in which a virtue-theoretic proposal is supplemented with an 
anti-luck condition?35  
 The upshot is that once we introduce the distinction between direct and diffuse epistemic 
dependence, then there is reason to think that knowledge cannot be exhaustively explained in 
virtue-theoretic terms, at least insofar as the robust virtue epistemologist wishes to retain her 
adherence to epistemic individualism. Moreover, we have noted that the idea that robust virtue 
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epistemology could just simply jettison a commitment to epistemic individualism is far from being 
above contention. Epistemic virtues are usually characterised, quite naturally, as cognitive abilities 
that supervene on internal, physical features of the agents whose abilities they are. But our 
argument shows that there are epistemic differences between virtue-theoretic duplicates, thus 
understood. Finally, while the virtue epistemologist might eschew the significance of Goldberg’s 
distinction by rejecting the existence of diffuse epistemic dependency, since this is a characteristic 
commitment of contemporary social epistemology, this option is not very appealing either. The 
challenge posed for robust virtue epistemology by our argument is thus quite pressing indeed.36 
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